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ABSTRACT
The optimal research and development of green technology taxes (subsidies) is analyzed in a three-stage game model 
of an international Cournot duopoly. The governments simultaneously determine the environmental policies in the first 
stage. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously determine the green technology levels and set the output in the 
third stage. One firm exists in a home country and one firm exists in a foreign country that produce homogenous goods 
and export to the third-market country. By assuming that the green technology involves cost-increasing research and 
development (R&D), the present study finds that green technology is not overused to minimize the total production costs. 
Keywords: Strategic trade policy; green technology; strategic environmental policy
ABSTRAK
Cukai(subsidi) optimal ke atas penyelidikan dan pembangunan teknologi hijau dianalisis dengan model permainan 
tiga-tingkat bagi persaingan duopoli antarabangsa Cournot. Kerajaan secara serentak menentukan polisi alam 
sekitar di tingkat pertama. Di tingkat kedua, firma secara serentak menentukan tahap teknologi dan seterusnya jumlah 
pengeluaran ditentukan pada tingkat ketiga. Sebuah firma di negara domestik dan sebuah lagi di negara luar mengeluar 
dan mengeksport barangan yang homogen ke negara pasaran ketiga. Dengan andaian teknologi hijau melibatkan 
penyelidikan dan pembangunan (P&P) dengan kos bertambah, kajian ini mendapati bahawa teknologi hijau tidak 
dieksploitasi bagi meminimakan kos pengeluaran. 
Kata kunci: Polisi perdagangan strategik; teknologi hijau; polisi alam sekitar strategik
INTRODUCTION
A number of governments subsidize research and 
development (R&D) activities leading to the production 
of green technology1 by domestic firms. Such subsidies 
are primarily given to industries in which firms compete 
in the international imperfect competition market. The 
present study presents a positive analysis to explain such 
trade strategy policies in the context of an imperfectly 
competitive world where green technology R&D (GT-
R&D) rivalry between firms plays a significant role2.
The present study focuses upon the possible 
subsidization of product R&D, such as subsidization 
of green technology in producing hybrid vehicles 
in the USA and Japan. In order to promote green 
technology, the U.S government has been supporting 
the consumer purchase of hybrid vehicles in the 
forms of the tax deduction and production subsidies 
(Beresteanu & Li 2011). In contrast to previous studies,3 
GT-R&D is assumed to be a cost-increasing R&D, which 
means that the total cost of production rises. Thus, the 
primary objective of the present study is to demonstrate 
how the strategies change when the costs of R&D differ 
from the previous framework. In particular, the rivalry 
in green technology development describes the game of 
R&D in product innovation.
An argument for strategic environmental policy 
has been developed by many analysts such as Barrett 
(1994), Markusen et al. (1995), Sturm (2001) and Yanase 
(2010). A strategic environmental policy considers the 
production activities of two firms that generate pollution 
emissions, which cause purely local damage. The models, 
based on imperfect competition market, are successful 
in explaining the tragedies of an ‘ecological dumping’ 
and ‘race-to-bottom’. In contrast to Barrett (1994), the 
assumption is made in the present study, for simplicity, 
that the firms do not generate pollution emissions and, 
thus, no abatement costs are to be considered. However, 
instead of simply fulfilling the regulation, the GT-R&D 
is invented to fulfil green product demand or to create a 
green technology trend.4
The present study employs the strategic R&D 
policy framework of Spencer andBrander (1983), which 
includes an assumption that firms compete a la Cournot. 
Spencer and Brander (1983) find that if the export subsidy 
is applicable, a country will not choose to subsidize 
R&D. Their model is based on an assumption that the 
process R&D is assumed to be cost-decreasing R&D. In 
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contrast, the present study examines product R&D and 
assumes that the GT-R&D increases production costs. 
In addition, export subsidies are not considered in the 
present study because World Trade Organization (WTO) 
codes restrict direct export subsidies. The present study 
finds that GT-R&D is not overused to minimize total 
costs and the optimal subsidy is positive. The findings 
also demonstrate that governmental subsidies encourage 
firms to invest in green technology.
The strategic behaviour of agents in the present 
model are also similar to the Spence & Brender (1983), 
in which GT-R&D is assumed to be undertaken before 
the associated output is produced. The firms anticipate 
the effect of R&D on the resolution of output shares. The 
efficacy of government policy in the present study arises 
from the assumption that a government can credibly 
commit itself to R&D subsidies before R&D decisions are 
made by private firms. The motivation for governmental 
policy in the present study is similar to previous studies 
(e.g., Barrett 1994), which assume that a country attempts 
to capture a larger share of production or rent shifting. 
However, the difference in the present study is that the 
national incentive does not arise from damage costs 
because pollution is assumed to be consumption-pollution 
that occurs in a third country (e.g., Barrett 1994; Sturm 
2001). The present study finds that a subsidy policy is 
optimal.
The remainder of the present study is organized as 
follows. Section 2 explains the basic setup of the model 
and the results in the quantity competition stage. Section 
3 presents and discusses the results of subsidies of GT-
R&D. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
MODEL
The basic setup of the model is based on a standard 
third-country model. Consider two symmetric countries, 
home and foreign, with one firm each. The model is 
analyzed on a three-stage game played by two competing 
firms and two competing governments. In the first 
stage, the governments choose GT-R&D subsidies. The 
governments know a game is being played by the firms. 
In the second stage, as the second player, the firms choose 
R&D levels and, in the third stage, choose output levels.
Firm i produces output xi at variable cost Ci, which 
includes all costs except GT-R&D and earns revenue 
Ri (x1, x2) = p(x1, x2)xi. The GT-R&D level of firm i 
and cost per unit is denoted gi and αi, respectively. For 
simplicity, production externality is omitted. The profit 
function of firm i is then denoted:
 πi(x1, x1; gi) = Ri(x1, x1) – Ci(x1, x1; gi) – αgi (1)
Output x1  and x2  are assumed homogenous. 
Therefore, using subscripts to denote derivatives, this 
implies:
 Rj
i < 0 and Rij
i < 0 (2)
A rise in the cost-increasing GT-R&D increases 
Ci given that xi and the rate of increase increases as  xi 
rises. Therefore, firms must pay an additional cost of 
producing a green product (refer to the argument of 
Sallee (2011)). Marginal cost, Cx
i , is assumed to rise as 
gi  increases. Thus:
 Cg
i > and Cigg < 0 (3)
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium in output is 
characterized by first order condition as follows:
 πxi
i = Rxj
i (x1, x2) = Cxi
i (xi; gi) (4)
where
 
Rxi
i (x1, x2) = p(x1 + x2) + p'(x1 + x2) xi. Second order 
conditions are characterized as follows:
 
π ixixi = R
i
xixi  = C
i
xixi = 0 (5)
The effect of output on marginal profit is also 
assumed to dominate cross effects, giving rise to the 
following condition:
 D = π111 π
2
22  – π
1
12 π
2
21 > 0 (6)
This condition holds globally and ensures the 
uniqueness and global stability of the equilibrium.
The solution x1 and x2 in (4) depend on g1 and g2, 
which can be written as:
 x
1 = f 1(g1, g2) and x2 = f 2(g1, g2) (7)
Outputs depend on marginal cost, which depend on 
gi. An increase in cost-increasing GT-R&D by firm 1 
will increase marginal cost, shifting its reaction function 
inward and decreasing its output and market share, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, by the move from P to Q. The 
reaction functions in the diagram are downward sloping. 
This follows from the total differentiation of (4) with 
respect to x1 and x2, holding both g1 and g2 constant, which 
yields the slope of the reaction function, dx
i
–––
dxj
 =  – 
Rixixj–––
πixixi
, 
which is negative from (2) and (5).
The total differentiation of (4) with respect to x1 
and g1 yields:
 fgi
i = 
dxi
–––
dgj
 = 
Cixigiπ2x2x2–––––––
D
 < 0 and
 fgi
j = 
dxi
–––
dgj
 = – 
Cixigiπ2x2x1–––––––
D
 > 0 (8)
Based upon equations (4), (5) and (6), equation (8) 
shows that a firm’s output decreases a firm’s own GT-
R&D and increases the rival firm’s GT-R&D. To sum up, 
the following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 1 The GT-R&D lowers own output and 
increases the rival output. 
Intuitively, given that the product innovation is 
cost-increasing, the GT-R&D causes the firms to pay 
innovation costs. In contrast to process R&D, which 
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lowers the production costs, hence GT-R&D increases a 
fi rm’s output and lowers the rival fi rm’s output.
Rewriting the profi t function as functions of gi, the 
GT-R&D levels that the fi rms choose in the preceding 
stage are analyzed. The profi t function for fi rm i is 
rewritten as follows:
θi = πi ( f 1(g1, g2), f 2(g1, g2); gi) (9)
Based upon equations (1), (4) and (8), the Nash 
equilibrium in R&D level is characterized by the fi rst 
order conditions of equation (9), as follows:
θ igi = π
i
xi  f 
i
gi + π
i
xj  f 
i
gi – C
i
gi  – α = 0 (10)
= Rixj  f 
i
gi – C
i
gi  – α = 0 (11)
since πi
i = 0 and πj
i = Rj
i. The second order condition is 
as follows:
 θ igigi = R
i
xj f 
j
gigj  + f 
j
gi ( dRixi–––dgj ) – C ixg f igi – Cigg < 0 (12)
And assuming the condition is analogous to equation 
(6), which ensures the uniqueness and global stability of 
the equilibrium, yields the following equation:
D = θ1g1g1 θ
2
g2g2 – θ
1
g1g2 θ
2
g2g1  > 0 (13)
Based upon equations (2), (8) and (10), equation (11) 
yields the following equation:
Rixj  f 
j
gj  = C
i
g + α < 0 (14)
Hence, equation (14) yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2 GT-R&D is not overused to minimize the 
production costs 
This result, equation (14), differs from the Spencer 
and Brander (1983), given that domestic GT-R&D causes 
the increase of rival outputs. In particular, Spencer and 
Brander (1983) show that a fi rm may over invest in R&D 
during the R&D process. Intuitively, R&D is not overused 
since GT-R&D cannot be used to minimize total costs 
for the output chosen.
TRADE POLICY
In this section, trade (industrial) policy, in the form of 
GT-R&D subsidies, is demonstrated to enable a domestic 
fi rm to capture a larger share of the world market so as 
to increase profi ts and rent. 
The government is assumed to be an agent that can 
set subsidy rates on GT-R&D expenditure in a period 
before the fi rms spend on GT-R&D. The assumption is 
that a government can pre-commit itself to such subsidies 
is similar to the previous studies (e.g., Barrett 1994; 
Spencer &Brander 1983; Sturm 2001).
The profi t function of a fi rm with a subsidy, per unit 
of GT-R&D, is redefi ned as follows:
 θi(g1, g2; s) = R1(x1, x2) – C1(x1, g2) – (α – s)gi (15)
The point of interest concerns the effects of 
subsidies on GT-R&D levels. The subsidy shifts out the 
R&D reaction function of the domestic fi rm, increasing 
its equilibrium GT-R&D and reducing the GT-R&D 
undertaken by the foreign firm, provided reaction 
functions are downward sloping. The results are obtained 
by the total differentiation of the fi rst order conditions 
of (15) as follows:
 dg
1
–––
ds
 = – 
θ2x2x2–––
D
 > 0 and 
dg2
–––
ds
  = 
θ2x2x1–––
D
 < 0 (16)
As a result, the following proposition is put forward:
Proposition 3 A domestic GT-R&D subsidy increases 
domestic GT-R&D and reduces foreign GT-R&D given 
θ2x2x1 < 0. If θ
2
x2x1 > 0, foreign GT-R&D rises.
Q
X1
Output reaction functions: Firm 1
Output reaction functions: Firm 2
X2
P
FIGURE 1. Reaction Function
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THE OPTIMAL DOMESTIC GT=R&D SUBSIDY
The optimal subsidy is found by maximizing net domestic 
welfare. For simplicity, environmental damages are 
omitted. To sum up, welfare is defined as follows:
 ω1(s) = θ1(g1, g2; s) – sg1  (17)
Based upon equation (1), equation (17) represents 
domestic welfare with subsidy.
The level of GT-R&D chosen by the domestic firm 
is the level that maximizes its profit within the confines 
of the behavior that characterizes the two-stage Nash 
Equilibrium. If a firm violates this equilibrium, it risks 
the possibility of earning lower profit during the unstable 
situation that follows. By providing a subsidy to firms, 
a government alters the perceived cost structure and 
changes the set of actions that are compatible with the 
two-stage Nash equilibrium. This allows a domestic firm 
to earn a higher profit net of the subsidy.
However, the present study examines the incentives 
facing a single government. Additionally, the use of 
the benefit function, equation (17), involves the usual 
assumptions necessary for partial equilibrium surplus 
analysis. In particular, the private cost of R&D reflects its 
full social opportunity cost if GT-R&D is not subsidized. 
Based upon equation (17), the first order condition for 
the welfare maximizing subsidy is as follows:
 
dω1
–––
ds
 = θ1
1fs
1 + θ2
1fs
2 + θs
1 – g1 – sgs
1 (18)
Based upon the sign of equations (15), (10) and (16), 
the subsidy is calculated as follows:
 s = θ2
1( dg2––dg1 ) > 0 (19)
The optimal GT-R&D subsidy is equal to the increase 
in a firm’s own profit from a reduction in the foreign 
firm’s GT-R&D brought about by an increase in a firm’s 
own GT-R&D. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal subsidy is positive.
NON COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM
Such GT-R&D rivalry does have a beggar-thy-
neighbour aspect. By imposing a subsidy, country 1 
gains at the expense of country 2. In one regard, a 
government considers an environmental effect of the 
subsidy. However, who bears the costs of subsidizing 
R&D is another aspect that should be considered by a 
government. The welfare function is rewritten as follows:
 Ωi(s1, s2) = gi(g1, g2; si) – sigi (20)
Equation (20) demonstrates that domestic welfare 
contains producer surplus, which depends on the 
subsidization of GT-R&D. This welfare function, 
equation (20), has the same form as equation (17) since 
the subsidy of country 2, s2, affects the profits of firm 1 
only indirectly through its impact on GT-R&D levels. 
The non-cooperative equilibrium occurs where ∂ω
1
–––
∂s1
 = 0, 
∂ω2
–––
∂s2
 = 0 and implies positive subsidies.
 s = nj
if jgi ( dgj–––dgi )  (21)
The sign of equation (21) is similar to equation 
(19). Therefore, if both firms are similar, the total rent 
is lower and both countries earn less rent at the non- 
cooperative equilibrium than they would if they had 
been able to come to an agreement not to subsidize GT-
R&D. Both producing countries are then worse off due 
to their subsidization of GT-R&D. Intuitively, consuming 
countries gain from the fall in prices resulting from 
greater production.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
National governments play a significant role in certain 
international markets, particularly newly emerging green 
technologies. In this emerging industry, a small number 
of firms exist that compete for market shares. Therefore, 
governments and firms have a clear understanding that 
they are involved in a strategic game involving foreign 
counterparts.
The present study examines a market in which 
domestic firms and foreign firms compete for market 
shares in a third market. The approach is similar to a 
volume of previous papers concerning R&D rivalry. 
However, the present study shows that the strategic game 
played by firms leads them to not overuse GT-R&D in 
the absence of government policy. On the other hand, 
governments have an incentive to subsidize GT-R&D 
to enable domestic firms to capture a larger share of the 
market.5 Furthermore, government subsidies encourage 
firms to do more ‘green R&D’ in the place of tough 
environmental regulations proposed by the ‘Porter 
hypothesis’.6
It should be emphasized that the analysis presented 
in the present study is not in any sense a recommendation 
that environmental policies should be strategically used. 
The present study could be expanded in a number of ways. 
For instance, an empirical analysis can be conducted to 
prove the above results.
NOTES
1 The definition of ‘green technology’ or ‘green product’ is 
as follows: “At its most basic level, the green economy 
is the clean energy economy, consisting primarily of four 
sectors: renewable energy (e.g. solar, wind, geothermal); 
green building and energy efficiency technology; energy-
efficient infrastructure and transportation; and recycling 
and waste-to-energy. The green economy is not just about 
the ability to produce clean energy, but also technologies 
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that allow cleaner production processes, as well as the 
growing market for products which consume less energy, 
from fluorescent light bulbs to organic and locally 
produced food” (Chapple 2008: 1).
2 A number of studies incorporate environmental issues 
into the strategic trade model, such as surveys concerning 
international trade and environmental policy (Sturm 
2001; Sturm & Ulph 2002; Ulph 2002; Sturm 2003). 
Furthermore, Yanase (2010), among others, extansively 
develops a study of domestic pollution or production 
pollution.
3 Previous studies assume that R&D is a cost-decreasing 
R&D, including the study of international R&D 
rivalry pioneered by Spencer and Brander (1983) and 
subsequently extended by DeCourcy (2005), amongst 
others.
4 For example, Toyota kept the price of the Prius low 
because, in the long run, the firm wanted the hybrid 
drivetrain to be viewed as mainstream technology (Sallee 
2011).
5 A government should help domestic firms to invest in 
environmentally friendly technology. For instance, Juan 
(2011) argues that the subsidy policy of a government can 
encourage firms to engage in technological innovation
6 The ‘Porter hypothesis’ argues that tough environmental 
regulations are a means of encouraging firms to invest in 
the green technology (Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw 1999).
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